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Abstract 
According to the latest Microsoft Security Intelligence Report (SIR), worms were the 
second most prevalent information security threat detected in the first half of 2010 – the top 
threat being Trojans.  Given the prevalence and damaging effects of worms, research and 
development of worm counter strategies are garnering an increased level of attention.  However, 
it is extremely risky to test and observe worm spread behavior on a public network.  What is 
needed is a packet level worm simulator that would allow researchers to develop and test counter 
strategies against rapidly spreading worms in a controlled and isolated environment.  Jyotsna 
Krishnaswamy, a recent SJSU graduate student, successfully implemented a packet level worm 
simulator called the Wormulator.  The Wormulator was specifically designed to simulate the 
behavior of the SQL Slammer worm.  This project aims to improve the Wormulator by 
addressing some of its limitations.  The resulting implementation will be called the Improved 
Worm Simulator.   
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1 Introduction  
 
The goal of this project is to improve an existing worm simulator called the Wormulator.  
The resulting implementation will be called the Improved Worm Simulator.   
Computer worms are the second most prevalent information security threat found by anti-
malware software today – the most prevalent being Trojans [15].  Given the growth of the 
Internet and the sheer volume of critical information and money that is exchanged daily through 
the Internet, a fast spreading worm could inflict tremendous financial losses to individuals, 
businesses, and other organizations across the globe.  The effects of recent real world computer 
worms have already shown us the financial devastation that could result.  For example, the 
financial loss caused by the Conficker worm had been estimated to be as high as $9.1 billion 
[18]. 
Not only do worms put a tremendous amount of money at risk, but people‟s safety and 
personal security can be at risk as well.  Communication systems, safety and security services, 
and emergency response systems are becoming increasingly reliant on networked resources that 
are accessed via the Internet.  If any of those systems are disrupted by massive congestion or 
failures in the network, people‟s lives could be at stake.  For example, the Slammer worm in 
2003 generated enough network congestion to cause failures in the 911-emergency system in 
Bellevue, Washington [4]. 
The potential devastating effects of future computer worms has many information security 
experts, especially those affiliated with large enterprises, interested in worm research.  
Consequently, there‟s a considerable amount of money, time and effort being invested towards 
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the study of worm behavior models, worm detection methods, automated worm containment 
mechanisms, worm traffic simulations, etc [7].  Unfortunately, there are some significant 
challenges to studying worms.   
Due to the disruptive nature and potential damaging effects of worms, it is highly unethical 
to perform worm experiments on the Internet, regardless of intentions.  The disruption and 
damages caused by even an accidental release of a worm can draw severe penalties, including 
criminal prosecution.  Without the luxury of being able to use the Internet as their testing ground, 
worm researchers are forced to resort to running simulations in a relatively small isolated 
network. 
Researchers have taken one of two approaches to worm simulation.  One approach is to 
simulate worms by using mathematical models that leverage epidemiological equations used to 
describe the spread of real-world diseases [13].  Another approach is to use packet level worm 
simulations that leverage existing network simulators [17].  A recent SJSU graduate project took 
a lightweight network simulator known as the Spamulator (used to simulate spam propagation) 
and enhanced it to simulate the SQL Slammer worm.  The Spamulator enhancement is called the 
Wormulator [1].   
The purpose of this project is to make the following improvements to the Wormulator: 
1. Increase the scalability of the Wormulator from a few thousand active worm nodes to at 
least one hundred thousand active worm nodes. 
2. Improve the Wormulator‟s simulation of the Slammer worm by implementing a more 
realistic handling of network saturation, as opposed to the automatic gradual slowdown to 
a near standstill, as exhibited by Wormulator. 
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3. Implement a more realistic infection probability – the Wormulator currently implements 
a 100% infection probability. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: 
 Section 2 Computer Worms: defines what computer worms are, explains how computer 
worms function, describes various worm propagation methods, and provides an overview 
of the SQL Slammer worm. 
 Section 3 Wormulator: describes the Wormulator architecture, gives a functional 
overview of the Wormulator, provides the implementation details of the Wormulator, and 
highlights some improvement opportunities for the Wormulator. 
 Section 4 Improved Worm Simulator: details the architecture, functional overview and 
implementation of the Improved Worm Simulator. 
 Section 5 Simulation Setup and Results: describes the simulation setup, presents the 
simulation results, and discusses the simulator‟s performance. 
 Section 6 Future Work:  discusses deficiencies that were not addressed by the Improved 
Worm Simulator and proposes future work. 
 Section 7: Conclusion 
 
2 Computer Worms 
 
Simply put, computer worms are self-propagating malware.  Malware is defined as any 
software that has malicious intent, hence the prefix “mal.”  The key difference between worms 
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and viruses is that worms actively search for and infect vulnerable machines across a network 
[22].  Once the initial computer is infected, a worm uses the network to spread itself from one 
computer to another by exploiting network security vulnerabilities in operating systems and/or 
applications on other computers.  Each newly infected node will attempt to infect all other nodes 
that it can reach.  As the number of infected nodes increase, the number of network wide 
infection attempts (scans) increase.  And as the number of network wide infection attempts 
increase, the number of newly infected nodes increases at a much faster rate, and so on.  
Leveraging the Internet‟s volume of potential victims and highly connected infrastructure has 
proven to be a highly effective method for propagating worms. 
 
2.1 Worm Propagation Methods 
 
We can characterize a worm by the method in which it propagates itself.  Some of the key 
components of a worm‟s propagation method are: 
 Transfer mechanism  
 The manner in which it selects target addresses  
 Speed 
A worm will typically use one or more transfer mechanisms to copy itself to other 
computers.  A worm may use message exchange applications such as email, Internet relay chat, 
or instant messaging.  A worm might use a network protocol such as TCP or UDP.  Or a worm 
might use inter-process communication mechanisms such as named pipes, shared memory, or 
shared folders to transfer itself to other computers. 
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One of the primary functions of a worm is to seek out potential victims to infect.  But, in 
order to infect another computer, the worm must know the target computer‟s IP address, and the 
target computer must be vulnerable to the worm‟s attack.  There are two general ways for worms 
to choose their targets.  A worm can randomly generate target addresses, or a worm can use a 
pre-generated list of known vulnerable target addresses.   
If a worm randomly generates the target addresses, it can use a uniform random scanning 
method, or a local preference scanning method.  In the uniform random scanning method, a 
worm randomly and uniformly selects IP addresses from the entire range of Internet addresses.  
Uniform random scanning is highly inefficient, considering there are only a relatively small 
number of vulnerable hosts in such a large address space as the entire Internet [14] [16].  In local 
preference scanning, a worm randomly selects IP addresses, but the selection method is biased 
towards addresses that are located in local networks, such as enterprise intranets [17].  Local 
preference scanning worms tend to spread much more rapidly.  There are two reasons for this.  
Number one, the addresses from a local network address space tend to have a higher probability 
of being reachable and active.  Number two, the density of vulnerable hosts tend to be higher in a 
local network, because hosts in a local network tend to be of the same type and tend to be 
configured in the same way.   
Although a worm that uses local preference scanning can be much more efficient than a 
worm that uses uniform random scanning, they pale in comparison to a worm that uses a pre-
generated “hit list” of known vulnerable target addresses.  Such a worm is referred to as a flash 
worm, and can be orders of magnitudes faster.  Given an accurate list of known vulnerable host 
addresses, the predicted speed at which a flash worm can infect vulnerable hosts is incredible.  It 
has been shown that, given pristine conditions, a flash worm can theoretically infect over 95% 
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of a million vulnerable hosts in just over half a second [6].  However, the key to a flash worm‟s 
success is an accurate list of vulnerable host addresses.   Due to the highly complex and dynamic 
nature of the Internet, it can be quite a monumental task to procure a reliable list of valid and 
vulnerable addresses.  It is for this reason that the feasibility of flash worms is questioned by 
most experts.  However, it would be unwise to ignore the possibility of an effective flash worm.  
Researchers have proposed methods to circumvent problems that arise from the highly dynamic 
nature of the Internet [6].  
Speed is another component of a worm‟s propagation method.  One might assume that a 
worm must scan as fast as possible in order to infect as many victims as possible before it is 
detected and removed.  Interestingly enough, a slow scanning worm has a much higher chance of 
infecting more computers than a fast scanning worm [16].  A slow scanning worm can evade 
detection because the traffic that it generates appears to be normal. A fast scanning worm, on the 
other hand, can generate an unusually high number of connection attempts which can easily be 
detected and removed from an infected computer, thus limiting the spread of the worm. 
Regardless of the specific methods used to propagate a worm, the fact that worms can 
propagate on their own, have global reach, and can spread at rapid rates, makes worms one of the 
most effective and devastating forms of malware out there.   The next subsection gives an 
overview of the SQL Slammer worm.  The SQL Slammer worm is the real-world worm that the 
Improved Worm Simulator attempts to model. 
 
2.2 SQL Slammer Worm 
 
7 
 
Of the twenty-three worms that were released in the “wild” this past decade, SQL Slammer 
is one that has garnered a tremendous amount of attention and notoriety [12].   This is due to the 
speed that Slammer exhibited, as well as the significant damage that it inflicted, in terms of 
financial and productivity loss. 
SQL Slammer, or just Slammer, was unleashed upon the Internet on January 25, 2003 [4].  
As of the writing of this report, Slammer has the distinction of being the fastest worm in history.   
Slammer achieved its remarkable speed by simply sending 404 byte UDP packets that exploited 
buffer overflow vulnerabilities in Microsoft‟s SQL Server software [9].  By using UDP, 
Slammer did not have to wait for a response from its target – as would have been the case, if 
TCP had been used.   Instead, Slammer could continually send UDP packets as fast as the host‟s 
network bandwidth would allow.  Given a 100 Mbps network connection, Slammer could 
manage a scan rate of around 26,000 scans per second [4].  Ironically, it was Slammer‟s 
aggressive nature and incredible speed that limited its success.   
Slammer used the uniform random scanning method to select its targets.  By using the 
uniform random scanning method, Slammer achieved an initial exponential growth, doubling the 
infected population every 8.5 seconds [19].  Within a few minutes, however, the infection rate 
slowed significantly due to continual retries of already infected hosts, non-existing hosts, and 
immune hosts.  In addition to that, the scan traffic overwhelmed the global network causing 
numerous network outages and system failures, which further exacerbated the slowing of the 
infection rate [4]. 
Unfortunately, by that time, Slammer had already done significant damage.  In South Korea, 
twenty-seven million people lost their cell phone and Internet access.  In Portugal, three hundred 
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thousand people had their cable modems crash on them.  Corporate email systems around the 
globe slowed to a grinding halt.  911 emergency response teams had to resort to the use of pencil 
and paper to handle emergency calls.  Airlines had to cancel many flights due to their inability to 
process tickets [19].   
Although worms typically carry a malicious payload, Slammer showed us that worms do not 
necessarily need to have malicious payloads to cause considerable harm.  All told, the cost of 
Slammer had been estimated to be between $950 million and $1.2 billion [20].  
 
3 Wormulator 
 
The simulator implemented in this project is built upon a previous implementation of a 
worm simulator called the Wormulator.  This section gives some background on the 
Wormulator, describes the Wormulator‟s architecture, gives a functional overview of the 
Wormulator, provides some implementation details of the Wormulator, and describes some 
opportunities for improvement.    
The Wormulator is a packet level worm simulation program developed by Jyotsna 
Krishnaswamy, a former Graduate student of San Jose State University [1].  It is an extension of 
the Spamulator, a lightweight network simulator that runs on a single machine developed by 
John Aycock, Heather Crawford, and Rennie deGraaf to teach a course on spam and spyware [3].   
The main objective of the Wormulator was to simulate the behavior of the SQL Slammer Worm 
using a virtual network of thousands of server nodes running on a single machine [1].  But, in 
order to simulate the SQL Slammer worm, the handling of User Datagram Protocol (UDP) 
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packets had to be supported.  Unfortunately, the Spamulator only supported the Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP), thus the Spamulator had to be modified to support UDP.    In addition to 
providing support for UDP, the final version of Wormulator included these additional 
enhancements [1]:   
 Simulated network nodes are executed as threads, instead of independent processes – the 
original implementation of Wormulator used independent processes, which limited the 
scale of Wormulator to only a couple thousand nodes [1]. 
 Network traffic measurements – the number of packets in the network, measured once 
per second of simulation time. 
 Simulation of congestion in the network – signals congestion when the network traffic 
increases beyond a pre-defined bandwidth limit, and throttles the traffic rate accordingly. 
 
3.1 Wormulator Architecture and Functional Overview 
 
Depicted in Figure 3.1-1 below is the system architecture of the Wormulator.  The large 
box that encompasses everything but the “Outside World” represents a single computer, be it a 
laptop, PC, or server.  At the core of the Wormulator is the Loopback Network Simulator (LNS) 
[1].  The LNS creates and initializes all simulated network nodes, handles all of the incoming 
worm traffic, puts newly infected network nodes into worm propagation mode, keeps track of the 
traffic rate, and simulates network congestion.   
Initially, when the Wormulator is first launched, there are no simulated network nodes 
running.  A setup script called servers.pl is executed to create the simulated network nodes.  The 
number of simulated network nodes desired is configurable and defined in the setup script.  For 
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each simulated network node to be simulated a “wake up” packet is sent to the Wormulator.  For 
each “wake-up” packet received by the Wormulator, a new thread is created and that represents a 
distinct simulated network node.  Every simulated network node starts out in the uninfected state.  
They simply run in a loop listening for UDP packets. 
 
 
 
To actually begin the worm spread, the worm_spread.pl script is executed.  The 
worm_spread.pl script sends a single UDP packet to infect one of the simulated network nodes.  
That initial infected node then begins randomly generating target IP addresses and sends worm 
packets to each of the generated target addresses.  If a randomly generated target address 
matches the address of a simulated network node then a successful infection will be achieved.  
Worm setup 
and launch 
scripts 
Outside World 
Packets to non-
simulated IP 
addresses 
WORMULATOR  
Iptables 
LNS  
 Incoming packet handler 
 Traffic measurement 
 Network congestion control 
 
LibIPQ (User 
Space Packet 
Queue) 
Packets to 
simulated IP 
addresses 
Simulated 
Worm Node 
Simulated 
Worm Node 
simulated 
Server 
Client 
Program 
Initialization 
Packets to 
worm nodes 
Figure 3.1-1 System Architecture of Wormulator 
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Each newly infected worm node in turn randomly generates target IP addresses and sends worm 
packets to each the generated target address.  Each infected worm node continues sending worm 
packets indefinitely, or until the Wormulator is killed by the user.   
  A critical requirement when simulating a worm is to ensure that the worm traffic does not 
escape to the “outside world.”   Unfortunately, the Wormulator must use the network interface 
card of the local machine to send and receive packets [1].  Therefore, the network card must be 
active and connected to the network while executing the tool.  So to ensure that all worm traffic 
remains on the local machine, iptables and the libIPQ library are used to redirect worm traffic 
back to the Wormulator.  Packets destined for a simulated worm node are redirected by IP Table 
rules to a user space packet queue called the IPQ, implemented in the libIPQ library.   
Every packet that ends up on the IPQ ultimately gets handled by the packet handler 
routine in the Wormulator‟s LNS module [1].  The LNS module retrieves packets from the IPQ 
and checks the destination address of each packet to determine if a new network node gets 
infected or not.  If the packet is destined for an uninfected node then that node is marked as 
infected and gets put into worm propagation mode.   If the packet is destined for an already 
infected node then the LNS module simply marks the packet as accepted and releases it back to 
the iptables for final traversal.    Packets destined for non-simulated IP addresses are allowed to 
proceed to its destination, untouched by the Wormulator. 
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3.2 Wormulator Implementation 
 
Wormulator leverages the bulk of its implementation from the Linux version of the 
Spamulator.  Apart from the server initialization and worm launch scripts, all of the 
modifications were done in a single source code module – the lns.cpp module [1].  The core 
functionality of Wormulator lies primarily in the LNS module.  The pseudo-code for the 
Wormulator‟s LNS module is given in Figure 3.2-1.  The LNS module begins by creating a user 
datagram socket and listens for incoming UDP packets. When the LNS module receives a UDP 
packet, the destination address and port of the packet is determined.   
If the destination address and port does not match that of an already infected worm node 
then a new thread is created, and that new thread executes the worm code described in Figure 
3.2-2.  The newly created worm node thread creates a user datagram socket, sets the „server 
alive‟ flag to true, and waits for the next packet.  When a second packet is received, the worm 
node is considered infected, and the worm propagation routine is called.  The pseudo-code for 
worm propagation is given in Figure 3.2-3.  The worm is a random scanning worm that models 
the behavior of the SQL Slammer worm [1].   
The worm generates a random IP address from the pool of simulated worm node addresses 
and sends a UDP packet to that address.  It repeats this indefinitely.  If the destination address 
and port does match that of an already infected worm node, then the LNS module updates the 
network traffic count, checks for congestion, adjusts the worm scan rate appropriately, marks the 
packet as accepted, and releases the packet for final traversal through the IP Table rules.    
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Figure 3.2-1 Pseudo-code for the LNS in Wormulator [1] 
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Figure 3.2-2 Pseudo-code of a Simulated Network Node [1] 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2-3 Pseudo-code of the UDP Worm [1] 
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The network traffic count is accumulated between time ticks – each tick marks the passing 
of one second of clock time.  On every tick of the clock the network traffic count of the previous 
time period is logged, and the network traffic count is reset to zero.  The signals SIGUSR1 and 
SIGUSR2 are user defined signals used to simulate the effect of congestion in the network.  The 
SIGUSR2 signal is used to indicate a congestion free network.  From the start of the simulation 
until the point at which the network saturation threshold is reached, the SIGUSR2 signal is 
signaled at every time tick.  Each time the SIGUSR2 signal is signaled, the sleepRange is 
decreased by a certain amount, which in turn increases the rate at which each worm node sends 
packets.  Once the bandwidth saturation threshold is reached, congestion in the network is 
indicated by the SIGUSR1 signal and the sleepRange is decreased at every new instant of time.   
 
3.3 Opportunities for Improvement  
 
This section describes three ways that the Wormulator can be improved.  Although, there 
may be many other opportunities for improvement, only the ones that will be addressed by the 
Improved Worm Simulator are discussed here.    
As mentioned earlier, the original implementation of the Wormulator used independent 
Linux processes to represent each simulated network node.  The overhead of each independent 
process, in terms of memory utilization and slow context switching, severely limited the scale of 
the original Wormulator.  The original Wormulator was only able to scale to a few thousand 
simulated worm nodes.  An attempt was made to improve the scalability of the Wormulator by 
converting to the use of POSIX threads instead of independent processes to represent each worm 
16 
 
node.  Unfortunately, just simply converting to the use of POSIX threads did not resolve the 
scalability issue.  Even by running the thread based version of the simulator on a dual-core 
processor machine, the simulation still had difficulties scaling beyond a few thousand nodes.  
With thousands of threads running simultaneously, both processors quickly reached maximum 
utilization, and the host machine quickly became unresponsive.  There is clearly an opportunity 
for improvement here. 
Another opportunity for improvement is in the manner in which Wormulator simulates the 
behavior of the worm once the network bandwidth saturation threshold is reached.  Upon 
reaching the network bandwidth saturation threshold, Wormulator automatically and 
precipitously throttles down the rate at which each worm node sends worm packets.   Recall that 
this is achieved by increasing the sleepRange at every time tick.  Unfortunately, this throttling 
down continues indefinitely, resulting in a precipitous decline in the network traffic, and before 
long the simulation slows to a virtual standstill.   A more accurate representation of actual worm 
behavior is for the network traffic to level out at the saturation point.  
The final opportunity for improvement is in how Wormulator handles infection 
probability.  Wormulator assumes that every randomly generated address is a vulnerable address.  
In other words, every worm packet sent by a worm node has a 100% success rate of infecting its 
target, assuming that the target is not already infected.  This is inaccurate.  First, the target 
address may not even be a valid address.  Second, the host that‟s associated with the target 
address may be disconnected or inactive.  And finally, the host associated with the target address 
may not have the specific software or configuration that is vulnerable to the worm attack.    
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4 Improved Worm Simulator 
 
The Improved Worm Simulator is a Linux based packet level simulator that improves upon 
the Wormulator described in Section 3.  This section describes the architecture, functional 
overview, and implementation of the Improved Worm Simulator.   
 
4.1 Improved Worm Simulator Architecture and Functional Overview   
 
The first improvement objective for the Improved Worm Simulator was to scale the 
simulation to at least 100,000 active worm nodes.   One potential solution would have been to 
implement a distributed simulation using multiple physical interconnected machines, similar to 
the distributed worm simulation design in [17].  However, due to limited resources and funding, 
this was not feasible for this project.  One of the beneficial features of both the Spamulator and 
the Wormulator was their ability run on a single physical machine.   The authors of the 
Spamulator indicated that this was an important goal, since a great number of researchers have 
limited resources and funding [3].   Since the Improved Worm Simulator project was likewise 
limited in resources and funding, it was decided that the Improved Worm Simulator would be 
designed to run on a single machine as well.  In order to accomplish this, some fundamental 
changes had to be made to the architecture and functionality of the original simulator.   
The system architecture of the Improved Worm Simulator is depicted in Figure 4.1-1.    
Once again, the large box that encompasses everything but the “Outside World” represents a 
single computer, be it a laptop, PC, or server.  The bulk of the Improved Worm Simulator‟s 
functionality is contained in a central control unit called the Simulation Control Unit (SCU).   
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The SCU‟s role is analogous to the Wormulator‟s LNS module, but the functionality differs 
substantially.  A brief summary of the functionality and responsibilities of the SCU is provided 
in the box representing the SCU, in Figure 4.1-1.    
 
 
Figure 4.1-1 System Architecture of Improved Worm Simulator 
 
Also depicted in the architectural diagram, Figure 4.1-1, are a set of 1,000 persistent 
simulated worm node threads and a set of temporary simulated worm node threads.  The 
Improved Worm Simulator 
Worm launch 
script
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Packets to and from
non-simulated IP 
addresses
IP Tables
SCU
• Creates 1000 persistent worker threads to represent simulated worm nodes
• Empties IPQ and counts number of packets sent by worm nodes
• Determines if destination address is vulnerable or not, if yes increment 
infected count
• Based on infected count, determines how many iterations to have 1000 
worker threads send 100 packets each
• Creates temp worker threads when # infected not evenly divisible by 1000
• Signals network congestion to tell threads to throttle down send rate
LibIPQ (User Space 
Packet Queue)
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difference between a persistent worm node thread and a temporary one will be explained later in 
Section 4.2, the implementation section.  These persistent and temporary simulated worm node 
threads represent network nodes that have been infected.   Their primary role is to send worm 
packets to randomly generated target addresses.  Red dotted arrows are used to show the path of 
the worm packets through the system.   
A key addition to the system is a set of thread based condition signals and mutual 
exclusion control variables.  These condition signals and mutual exclusion control variables are 
critical to the complex thread synchronization needs of the Improved Worm Simulator.   The 
implementation section will describe how these condition signals and mutual exclusion variables 
are used.   
The iptables and the libIPQ library are used in the exact same way as it was in the 
Wormulator – to redirect worm traffic back to the simulator, thereby preventing worm packets 
from reaching the “outside world.”  The worm setup script, servers.pl, is no longer needed.  All 
of the setup and configuration is done by the simulation startup script, start_iws, or hardcoded in 
the Improved Worm Simulator. 
 
4.2 Improved Worm Simulator Implementation 
 
Just as the Wormulator leveraged the bulk of the Spamulator for its implementation, the 
Improved Worm Simulator leverages the bulk of the Wormulator for its implementation.  A 
majority of the changes were made to the core module – the lns.cpp module.  Some changes 
were made to the configuration and setup as well.   
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Recall that having more than a few thousand threads running concurrently on a single 
machine was prohibitive.  Despite the fact that the Linux machine used for this project was 
equipped with a dual-core processor, both memory and processor resources were quickly 
exhausted, rendering the simulation and the Linux machine unresponsive.   Through 
experimentation, it was discovered that running 1,000 concurrent threads was manageable.  
Given this constraint, the scalability problem was reduced to:  how can we simulate 100,000 
active worm nodes running a maximum of 1,000 concurrent threads at any given time?   The 
solution:  implement a cycle based simulation, where every simulated active worm node is 
allowed to complete a specified set of activities at each time cycle before moving on to the next 
time cycle.  
In the Improved Worm Simulator, each simulated active worm node sends 100 UDP 
packets during each time cycle – each packet destined to a randomly generated address.  This 
means that all simulated active worm nodes would be allotted time to send 100 packets before 
the simulation moves on to the next time cycle.  If this is done in a sequential fashion with 
100,000 active worm nodes, the simulation timescale factor would be 100,000 to 1.  In other 
words, it would take 100,000 seconds, or 27 hours and 46 minutes, to simulate 1 second of real 
time.  Obviously, this timescale factor is not practical.   
To reduce the timescale factor down to a more reasonable 100 to 1, the Improved Worm 
Simulator takes advantage of concurrent threads.  During each time cycle, the Improved Worm 
Simulator simulates active worm nodes in groups of up to 1,000 concurrent threads at a time 
until all active worm nodes have been represented for the current cycle.  For example, if there are 
3,500 active worm nodes, then in a single time cycle there would be 3 iterations running 1,000 
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concurrent threads and 1 iteration running 500 concurrent threads.  This essentially simulates 
having all 3,500 active worm nodes concurrently sending 100 packets each.   
The Improved Worm Simulator is designed to scale to any number of active worm nodes.  
For example, you could scale the simulation to 1,000,000 active worm nodes.  However, the time 
scale factor would then be 1,000 to 1 – a little over 17 ½ minutes to simulate 1 second of real 
time.   This is much better than the 100,000 to 1 timescale factor, but it would take a little over 
83 hours to simulate 5 minutes of worm activity.  The default configuration for the Improved 
Worm Simulator scales the simulation to 100,000 active worm nodes; that works out to be 100 
iterations of running 1,000 concurrent threads during each time cycle – a time scale factor of 100 
to 1.  At a timescale factor of 100 to 1, it would take a little over 8 hours to simulate 5 minutes of 
traffic – not ideal, but feasible.   This timescale factor is certainly reasonable for simulating fast 
spreading worms, since you would typically only have to simulate less than a minute of real 
time. 
Note, that scaling to 100,000 active worm nodes does not mean that there are only 100,000 
possible addresses in the target address range.  It simply means that only 100,000 of the possible 
target addresses are vulnerable to the worm attack.  The number of possible addresses that can be 
randomly generated is dependent on how many possible unique addresses there are in the 
simulation‟s configured target address range.  For example, if the configured target address range 
is any address between 10.1.0.0 to 10.20.200.250, then the number of possible target addresses is 
(20 x 200 x 250) = 1,000,000.   Given this address range and a 10% infection probability, the 
simulator can simulate 1,000,000 network nodes, with 100,000 nodes being vulnerable to 
infection.  Incidentally, the infection probability is one of the improvements made in the 
Improved Worm Simulator.  However, instead of aiming for a particular probability percentage, 
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the code is adjusted to maintain 100,000 maximum infections.  The infection probability is 
therefore dependent on the size of the target address range.  If the size of the target address range 
is 2,000,000 then the infection probability is 5%.  If the size of the target address range is 
5,000,000 then the infection probability is 2%. 
When the Improved Worm Simulator is started, the SCU immediately creates 1,000 
persistent worm threads.  This is done to avoid having to create 1,000 worm threads multiple 
times during each time cycle.  These 1,000 worm threads will persist throughout the entire 
simulation.   Each of these 1,000 persistent worm threads begins execution by waiting on a signal 
to send packets.    The worm spread at this point has not begun yet.    
To begin the worm spread, the worm_spread.pl script is run.  The worm spread script 
sends a single UDP worm packet destined for address 10.0.0.0.  This packet gets redirected to the 
IPQ by the IP Table rules.  The SCU retrieves this initial packet from the IPQ and sets the 
infected node count to 1.  The SCU then creates a temporary worm thread.  This temporary 
worm thread sends 100 UDP worm packets to randomly generated addresses selected from the 
configured target address range, and then exits.  Pseudo-code for the SCU, the SCU‟s packet 
processing routine, the temporary worm thread, and the persistent worm thread are given in 
Figures 4.2-1, 4.2-2, 4.2-3, and 4.2-4 respectively. 
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Define Global Variables: 
  MAXTHREADS = 1000, InfectedNodeCount = 0 
  WormTrafficRate = 0, maxPackets = 0 
   
Create MAXTHREADS # of persistent worm threads 
 
Wait for initial packet to arrive in IPQ 
Get initial packet P from IPQ 
 P destination is address Ad, port Pd 
 
InfectedNodeCount = 1 
 
Loop Forever: 
  IterationCount = InfectedNodeCount / MAXTHREADS 
  TempCount = InfectedNodeCount mod MAXTHREADS 
 
  For 1 to IterationCount: // run 1,000 persistent worm threads/iteration 
    Record send packets start time 
    Set sendPackets condition to 1 
    Broadcast sendPackets condition 
    Wait on condition to process packets 
    Call processPackets 
  End For 
   
  maxPackets = TempCount * PACKETS_TO_SEND 
   
  If TempCount > 0: 
    Record send packets start time 
  End If 
  
  For 1 to TempCount: // run temp worm threads 
    Create temp worm thread  
  End For 
 
  If TempCount > 0: 
    Wait on condition to process packets 
    Call processPackets 
  End If 
 
  Calculate WormTrafficRate 
  Output WormTrafficRate and InfectedNodeCount 
  Reset WormTrafficRate 
End Loop 
 
 
Figure 4.2-1 Pseudo-code for the SCU (Simulation Control Unit) 
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Set processPackets condition to 0 
 
Loop until IPQ empty: 
 
  Get packet P from IPQ 
 P destination is address Ad, port Pd 
 
  If Ad of packet P is vulnerable and not already infected: 
    Store (Ad, Pd, P’d) in infected list L 
    InfectedNodeCount = InfectedNodecount + 1 
  End If 
 
  Mark P accepted 
  Release P 
 
End Loop 
 
 
Figure 4.2-2 Pseudo-code for processPackets 
 
 
Global Variables: 
  PACKETS_TO_SEND = 100, SLEEPRANGE = 1000 
  maxPackets = TempCount * PACKETS_TO_SEND 
 
Create UDP socket 
 
For 1 to PACKETS_TO_SEND 
  Generate random target address Ad, and port Pd from specified range 
  Send packet P to target address 
  Sleep SLEEPRANGE microseconds 
End For 
 
packetsSent = packetsSent + PACKETS_TO_SEND 
 
If packetsSent = maxPackets 
  Record send packets end time 
  Set processPackets condition to 1 
  Signal processPackets condition 
End If 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2-3 Pseudo-code for a Temporary Worm Thread 
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Global Variables: 
  PACKETS_TO_SEND = 100, SLEEPRANGE = 1000 
  MAXPACKETS = MAXTHREADS * PACKETS_TO_SEND 
  threadsDone = 1 
 
 
Loop Forever: 
  Wait on condition to send packets 
  Create UDP socket 
   
  For 1 to PACKETS_TO_SEND: 
    Generate random target address Ad, and port Pd from specified range 
    Send packet P to target address 
    Sleep SLEEPRANGE microseconds 
  End For 
 
  Close UDP socket 
 
  packetsSent = packetsSent + PACKETS_TO_SEND 
 
  If packetsSent = MAXPACKETS: 
    Record send packets end time 
    Set sendPackets condition to 0 
    Set sendPacketsDone condition to 1 
    Broadcast sendPacketsDone condition 
    Continue to top of loop 
  End If   
 
  Wait on condition sendPacketsDone 
  threadsDone = threadsDone + 1 
 
  If threadsDone = MAXTHREADS: 
    Set threadsDone = 1 
    Set sendPacketsDone condition to 0 
    Set processPackets condition to 1 
    Signal processPackets condition 
  End If 
 
End Loop 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2-4 Pseudo-code for a Persistent Worm Thread 
 
The 100 UDP worm packets sent by the initial worm node are redirected to the IPQ by the 
IP Table rules.  The SCU retrieves each packet from the IPQ and determines if the destination 
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address is vulnerable to the infection.  If yes, then the address is added to the infected address 
list, the infected node count is incremented by 1, the packet is marked as accepted, and it is 
released to traverse the rest of the IP Table rules.  If no, the address is not added to the infected 
address list, the infected node count remains the same, the packet is marked as accepted, and it is 
released to traverse the rest of the IP Table rules.   
 After all of the incoming worm packets are processed, it is likely that the infected node 
count has increased.  The number of infected nodes will remain under 1,000 in the early time 
cycles.  While the infected node count remains under 1,000, the SCU creates and executes as 
many temporary worm threads as there are infected nodes.  Once the infected node count 
exceeds 1,000, then the persistent worm threads are used for every increment of 1000 infected 
nodes.  For example, if the total number of infected nodes is 26,860, then during each time cycle 
there would be 26 iterations where 1,000 persistent worm threads will send 100 packets each.  
That accounts for 26,000 infected nodes.  If the total number of infected nodes is not equally 
divisible by 1,000, then temporary worm threads are created to represent the excess number 
beyond the last increment of 1,000.  In this case, there are 860 infected nodes that remain, so 
during each time cycle an additional 860 temporary worm threads are created and run 
concurrently.  Those 860 temporary worm threads will send 100 packets each and exit. 
Recall that in the Wormulator, the LNS module was responsible for handling all incoming 
worm packets, examining each packet to determine if new nodes have been infected, keeping 
track of the worm traffic rate, and simulating network congestion.  It must do all of this while 
running concurrently with all of the other worm threads.   This meant that the LNS module was 
competing with thousands of threads for processing time.  As a result, the LNS module was 
running only a fraction of one percent of the time.  With so little time to perform its 
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responsibilities, the LNS could not possibly monitor the worm traffic rate accurately, nor could it 
remove the packets from the IPQ quick enough to avoid overflow.  To resolve this issue, the 
Improved Worm Simulator alternates the sending and receiving of packets on a per iteration 
basis.   
At the start of each iteration, all of the worm packets for that iteration are sent.  While the 
packets are being sent, the SCU waits on a condition signal.  After the last packets are sent, the 
worm thread that sent the last packet sends a signal to the SCU to wake up and process all of the 
packets in the IPQ.  Upon receiving the process packets signal, the SCU wakes up and begins 
processing the packets in the IPQ.  It examines each packet and determines if any new nodes are 
infected based on the destination address of each sent packet.   
The SCU also determines the current iteration‟s bandwidth threshold, which is the cut-off 
point for accepting new packets sent during the iteration.  The bandwidth threshold for an 
iteration is calculated using the following equation: 
 
                                       
                             
    
                                            
     
 
Equation 4.2-1 Bandwidth threshold for an iteration 
 
The first part of the equation determines how many packets per second are allotted to each 
iteration in the time cycle.   To determine the number of packets allotted for a particular iteration, 
you have to multiply the packets per second rate by the number of seconds it took to complete 
the iteration.  For example, if the NETWORK_BANDWIDTH is 2,000,000 packets per second, 
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and the number of iterations for the current cycle is 100, and the duration for the current iteration 
is 2500 milliseconds (2.5 seconds), then the iteration‟s bandwidth threshold is 50,000 packets. 
Implementing congestion control at the iteration level distributes the bandwidth limitation across 
all active worm nodes.  This approach achieves a more realistic behavior than cutting a time 
cycle short once the bandwidth is exceeded.   
After all of the packets are processed, the SCU then broadcasts a signal to inform all of 
the persistent worm threads to send the next batch of packets, thus beginning the next iteration.  
If needed, the last iteration might be handled by temporary worm threads, as explained earlier.  
The completion of the last iteration marks the end of the time cycle.  At the end of each time 
cycle, the following metrics are recorded by the SCU: 
 Worm Traffic Rate 
 Elapsed simulated real time 
 Infected Node Count 
 
The worm traffic rate is calculated using the following equation: 
 
                                              
                                                       
    
                
      
 
Equation 4.2-2 Worm Traffic Rate 
 
Note that the denominator is not the total simulation time to complete a time cycle, rather it‟s the 
average of all the iteration times during a time cycle.   This is because all iterations in a time 
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cycle are considered to be running parallel to one another, along the same time line.  For 
example, if there are a hundred iterations in a time cycle, and each iteration takes 2 seconds to 
complete, then the total simulation time to complete the time cycle is 200 seconds, but the 
elapsed simulated real time for the time cycle is only 2 seconds.  The elapsed simulated real 
times will be used as the horizontal axis values in our simulation results given in the next section.  
The infected node counts are recorded at the end of each time cycle for the same reason that the 
worm traffic rates are recorded at the end of each time cycle. 
5 Simulation Setup and Results 
 
This section describes the simulation setup and presents some simulation results along with 
some analysis. 
5.1 Simulation Setup 
 
The current version of the Improved Worm Simulator was successfully built and ran on an 
Intel based PC running the Ubuntu Linux operating system, version 10.10.  To build and install 
the Improved Worm Simulator, the source code should be unzipped to a user home directory 
(e.g. /home/arnold) and then steps 1 through 3 of the INSTALL file should be followed.  There 
will be some build errors on the first few build attempts.  A couple of the errors have to do with 
some missing libraries, as explained in the INSTALL file.  Other build errors result from having 
invalid directory paths hardcoded in the lns.cpp source file.   
Steps 4 and 5 of the INSTALL file and some other system configurations are handled by 
the start_iws script.  The start_iws script is shown in Figure 5.1-1.   Line 3 increases the 
maximum number of threads that can be created in the system.  Lines 4-8 increase the sizes of 
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the ip_queue, socket receive buffer, and socket send buffer.  The default size settings are not 
sufficient to handle the number of packets that are sent and received during each iteration.  Line 
21 clears any previous iptables rules.   Line 24 sets an iptables rule that redirects all UDP packets 
destined for addresses between 10.0.0.0 and 10.255.255.255 to a user space queue – in this case, 
the IPQ.   With this address range, the simulation could simulate up to 16,581,375 potential 
target addresses.  Incidentally, this specific range was chosen because addresses with 10 as the 
first octet are local private addresses, thus reducing the chance that worm packets actually reach 
a real public address outside the private network.  Line 25 sets an iptables rule that redirects UDP 
packets destined for the localhost‟s loopback address to the IPQ.  Finally, line 29 executes the 
simulator. 
 
Figure 5.1-1 start_iws script 
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The following are configurable simulation settings that involve modifying the lns.cpp 
source file: 
 NETWORK_BANDWIDTH – maximum simulation bandwidth in packets per second.   
 RANGE2, RANGE3, RANGE4 – max values for the second, third, and fourth octets 
respectively in the randomly generated target addresses. 
 LOWPORT, HIGHPORT – establishes the vulnerable port range, a kludge way to 
implement infection probability.   
 MAXTHREADS – number of persistent worm threads to create at startup. 
 PACKETS_TO_SEND – number of packets that each worm thread sends during each 
time cycle. 
 SLEEP_RANGE – number of microseconds to sleep between packets.  This is to 
simulate some sense of path delay. 
 
For the simulator to run properly, the network interface card on the host machine must be 
enabled and connected.  This is perfectly safe, since the worm packets never get beyond the 
network interface card – they are looped back.  To start the simulator, the start_iws script must 
be run.  At this point, the simulator outputs a few messages and then waits for the initial worm 
packet.  To actually begin the worm spread the worm_spread.pl script must be run.   CTRL-C is 
used to terminate the simulation. 
  
5.2 Simulation Results and Analysis 
 
Before the results are presented, the output of the simulations must be explained.   Figure 
5.2-1 shows a sample of the output generated by a simulation run.   Lines with 5 comma 
separated values represent the worm traffic and timing metrics for a particular iteration.  The first 
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value is the current cycle number.  The second value is the current iteration number and the total 
iterations for the current cycle, separated by a colon.  The third value is the elapsed “real” time 
for that iteration, measured in milliseconds.  The fourth value is the total number of packets sent 
during that iteration.  The last value is the total number of packets that were accepted during that 
iteration.  If the last value is less than the fourth value, this indicates that the bandwidth threshold 
was exceeded and congestion control measures were taken.   Each line that starts with “Infected 
Node Count” represents the total number of nodes that have been infected thus far. 
. 
. 
12, 70:74, 2546, 100000, 100000 
12, 71:74, 2467, 100000, 98681 
12, 72:74, 2486, 100000, 99441 
12, 73:74, 2470, 100000, 98801 
12, 74:74, 1075, 25300, 25300 
 
Infected Node Count 93786 
 
13, 1:94, 2479, 100000, 76850 
13, 2:94, 2442, 100000, 75703 
13, 3:94, 2457, 100000, 76168 
13, 4:94, 2424, 100000, 75145 
13, 5:94, 2427, 100000, 75238 
13, 6:94, 2485, 100000, 77036 
13, 7:94, 2501, 100000, 77532 
13, 8:94, 2406, 100000, 74587 
13, 9:94, 2518, 100000, 78059 
. 
. 
 
Figure 5.2-1  Simulation output 
 
To facilitate the charting of the results, the simulation output is also collected in two files 
located in the /home/user/Files directory.   One file is named traffic.csv, which contains the 
traffic metrics.  The other file is named inc.txt, which contains the infected node count data.   
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To demonstrate the Improved Worm Simulator‟s capability to correctly model the behavior 
of a uniform random scanning worm like the SQL Slammer worm, the results of three different 
simulation runs are presented here.  Each simulation is run with a different network size and 
bandwidth limit combination.  The number of vulnerable hosts is approximately the same in each 
simulation – around 100,000. 
Two charts are associated with each simulation run.  The first chart plots the worm traffic 
rate in packets per second against the elapsed time in seconds.  The second chart plots the 
infected node count against the elapsed time in seconds.   There are a total of 6 charts, 2 for each 
simulation. 
 
Figure 5.2-2 Worm Traffic Rate – 1M Hosts, 100K Vulnerable, 2M Bandwidth 
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Figure 5.2-3 Infected Node Count – 1M Hosts, 100K Vulnerable, 2M Bandwidth 
 
The results of the first simulation run are shown in Figures 5.2-2 and 5.2-3.  This first 
simulation is configured with a network size of 1 million potential target hosts, with 
approximately 100,000 of them being vulnerable to the attack.  The bandwidth limit for this 
simulation is set at 2 million packets per second, which is equivalent to what a 7200-NPE-G2 
Cisco router can handle [21].   
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Both the worm traffic rate and the infected node count plots exhibit the classic logistic 
form of the SQL Slammer worm, where the rate stays relatively low in the early stages and then 
grows exponentially for a period of time before leveling off at the bandwidth limit.   
 
 
Figure 5.2-4 Worm Traffic Rate – 2M Hosts, 100K Vulnerable, 3M Bandwidth 
 
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
0 5 10 15 20 25
Tr
af
fi
c 
R
at
e
 (
p
ac
ke
ts
 p
e
r 
se
co
n
d
)
Elapsed Time (seconds)
Worm Traffic Rate
network size = 2,012,868 hosts
max vulnerable  = 100,049 hosts
bandwidth limit = 3,000,000 pps
36 
 
 
Figure 5.2-5 Infected Node Count – 2M Hosts, 100K Vulnerable, 3M Bandwidth 
 
The second simulation‟s results are shown in Figures 5.2-4 and 5.2-5.   For this simulation 
the network size is increased to a little over 2 million potential target hosts, and the bandwidth 
limit is increased to 3 million packets per second.  With the network size doubled, the infection 
probability is essentially halved.  This results in slower growth in both the worm traffic rate and 
infected node count.  The slower growth in the worm traffic rate is hard to distinguish because of 
the scale of the vertical axis in Figure 5.2-4.  The difference can really be seen in the infected 
node count growth.  In the first simulation, at close to the 12 second mark, the infected node 
count is already at its max of 100,000.  Whereas in the second simulation, the infected node 
count is only 45,000 at around the 12 second mark. 
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Figure 5.2-6 Worm Traffic Rate – 5M Hosts, 100K Vulnerable, 3M Bandwidth 
 
0
500000
1000000
1500000
2000000
2500000
3000000
3500000
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Tr
af
fi
c 
R
at
e 
(p
ac
ke
ts
 p
er
 s
e
co
n
d
)
Elapsed Time (seconds)
Worm Traffic Rate
network size = 5,032,170 hosts
max vulnerable  = 100,101 hosts
bandwidth limit = 3,000,000 pps
38 
 
 
Figure 5.2-7 Infected Node Count – 5M Hosts, 100K Vulnerable, 3M Bandwidth 
 
The third simulation‟s results are shown in Figures 5.2-6 and 5.2-7.   For this simulation 
the network size is increased to a little over 5 million potential target hosts, and the bandwidth 
limit is kept at 3 million packets per second.  With a network size of little over 5,000,000 hosts 
and only 100,000 vulnerable hosts, the infection probability is only 2%.  Compared to simulation 
2, simulation 3 takes nearly twice as much time for the worm traffic to reach maximum 
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bandwidth.  Simulation 3 takes more than double the time as simulation 2 to reach maximum 
infection rate.  
 In all three simulations the worm spread is extremely fast – as evidenced by the very short 
total elapsed time in each simulation.  There are a couple of reasons for this.  Number one, the 
simulated target address range is extremely small compared to the entire Internet address range 
used by the real SQL Slammer worm.  Number two, varying path delays, bottlenecks, varying 
network bandwidths, and other network limitations are not taken into account in the simulation.  
 
5.3 Performance 
 
The simulations were run on a machine equipped with a 3.73 GHz dual-core processor and 
2 GB of physical memory.  Running 1,000 concurrent threads on this machine consumed a max 
of 400 MB of physical memory and fluctuated between 30-78% processor utilization.  With 
these performance metrics, the simulation slows the computer a little during peak processor 
usage; otherwise the computer had no problems performing other typical tasks while the 
simulation was running.   
The simulation timescale factor turned out to be closer to 140 to 1, instead of the 
theoretical 100 to 1 timescale factor mentioned in the implementation section.  For example, 
simulation 1 took 46 minutes to simulate 20 seconds.   The 100 to 1 timescale factor suggested 
earlier did not account for the time it would take for the SCU to examine all of the packets on the 
IPQ during the dequeuing phase of each iteration.   
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6 Future Work 
 
The Improved Worm Simulator can be used as a foundation for further work in resource 
limited packet level worm simulation.   Several improvements are suggested here.  The Improved 
Worm Simulator can technically simulate large scale networks with millions of potential targets, 
but it is still not practical to simulate more than a couple hundred thousand active worm nodes.  
An obvious improvement would be to distribute the simulation workload across many physical 
hosts.  However, to keep in line with the affordability and accessibility goals mentioned earlier, it 
is suggested that the number of physical hosts be limited to 3 to 5 physical hosts.    
The Improved Worm Simulator is flexible and scalable, but it also simplifies many aspects 
of a real network.  It does not account for things such as network topology, path delays, and 
varying bandwidths across the network.  These network characteristics can be stored in a local 
database, where it can be quickly queried and used to simulate a more realistic network.   
Another thing that the Improved Worm Simulator does not account for is competing network 
traffic.  For this, a separate physical host can be dedicated to send packets representing 
competing network traffic.   
 Another improvement that can be made is to make the simulation more portable.   
Currently, the Improved Worm Simulator is implemented for the Linux platform only.  Although 
the simulator is written entirely in C++, the simulator has a high dependency on the use of the 
libipq library, which is implemented for the Linux kernel only.   Because of this high 
dependency on the libipq library, making the Improved Worm Simulator portable might be a 
substantial undertaking.  However, it would definitely be worth considering. 
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7 Conclusion 
 
Attempting to implement a worm simulator that can be run on a single machine proved to be 
a challenge given the complexities of multi-thread programming and the limited memory and 
processor resources.  However, the implementation of the Improved Worm Simulator was a 
success.  The simulation results showed that the Improved Worm Simulator is able to scale to at 
least 100,000 active worm nodes, and that it correctly models the behavior of the SQL Slammer 
worm.   
The Improved Worm Simulator is highly configurable and scalable.  The scalability, 
however, is really dependent upon the patience and time constraints of the user.   If the user can 
tolerate hours or even days of simulation time, then the Improved Worm Simulator can scale to 
hundreds of thousands of infected nodes – perhaps even a million.  If the user cannot afford long 
simulation times, then the Improved Worm Simulator can still manage a reasonable scale of at 
least 100,000 infected nodes.   
In its current form, the Improved Worm Simulator can easily be used for instructional 
purposes.  Students can experiment with various configurations and observe the resulting 
changes in worm behavior.   Students can also modify the code to model other types of worms.  
The Improved Worm Simulator can be used as a research tool as well.  Researchers can use the 
current framework to implement and test various defensive strategies against various worm 
spread models. 
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